The following Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment
makes it clear whether it is necessary to transfer the vehicle after its sale
to prove it is actually sold.
2024 I NSC
289 Reportable
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL
NO. 4615 OF 2023
Karikho Kri
… Appellant
Versus
Nuney Tayang
and another … Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL
NO. 4716 OF 2023
J U D G M E
N T
SANJAY
KUMAR, J
1. In the
year 2019, Karikho Kri, an independent candidate,
Dr. Mohesh
Chai, candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and Nuney
Tayang,
candidate of the Indian National Congress, contested the election
to the
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu (ST)
Assembly
Constituency. The election was held on 11.04.2019 and Karikho
Kri emerged
victorious with 7538 votes, while Dr. Mohesh Chai secured
7383 votes
and Nuney Tayang secured 1088 votes.
2. Nuney
Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the
Itanagar
Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and
Arunachal
Pradesh, seeking a declaration that the election of Karikho Kri
was void on
the grounds mentioned in Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and
100(1)(d)(iv)
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the
Act of 1951’).
He also sought a consequential declaration that he stood
duly elected
from the said constituency.
3. By
judgment and order dated 17.07.2023, a learned Judge of the
Itanagar
Bench of the High Court allowed the election petition in part,
declaring
the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)
(d)(i) and
100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, but rejecting the prayer of Nuney
Tayang to
declare him duly elected, as he had not led any evidence to
prove the
allegations levelled by him against Dr. Mohesh Chai, the
candidate
with the second highest number of votes.
4. Aggrieved
thereby, Karikho Kri filed Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
before this
Court and Nuney Tayang filed Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023.
These
appeals were filed under Section 116A of the Act of 1951.
5. While
ordering notice in both the appeals on 31.07.2023, in
exercise of
power under Section 116B(2) of the Act of 1951, this Court
directed
that an election should not be held for the subject Constituency
which was
represented by Karikho Kri and permitted him to enjoy all the
privileges
as a Member of the House and of the constituted committees but
restrained
him from casting his vote on the floor of the House or in any of
the
committees wherein he participated as an MLA.
6.
Thereafter, during the course of the hearing of these appeals,
Karikho Kri
filed I.A. No. 73161 of 2024, as a fresh schedule for election to
the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was notified on
16.03.2024
and he wished to contest in the election that is proposed to be
held on
19.04.2024. He sought leave to contest as a candidate in the
upcoming
assembly election in the State of Arunachal Pradesh during the
pendency of
this appeal. By order dated 20.03.2024, this Court opined that
a strong
prima facie case had been made out by him and, in the light of the
said fact,
stayed the operation of the impugned judgment. This Court also
made it
clear that any steps taken by Karikho Kri in view of the stay order
would be
subject to the final decision that would be taken upon conclusion
of the
hearing of these appeals.
7. In his
election petition, Nuney Tayang claimed that the nomination
submitted by
Karikho Kri was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer,
Tezu, as he
did not disclose material particulars in his Affidavit filed in Form
No.26
appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. The High Court
framed nine
issues for determination in the election petition and ultimately
held against
Karikho Kri on Issue Nos. 1 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7 and 8.
Issue No.9
pertained to the relief claimed by Nuney Tayang. The relevant
‘Issues’
read as under:
‘1. Whether
there has been a non-disclosure of ownership of
Hero Honda
CD Dawn Motorcycle owned by the returned
candidate,
Shri Karikho Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-2446;
Kinetic Zing
Scooty owned by the wife of the returned candidate,
Smti. Bagilu
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-4474; Van, Maruti
Omni
Ambulance owned by the wife of the returned candidate,
Smti. Bagilu
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11A-3100 and TVS
Star City
Motorcycle owned by Shri Goshinso Kri, the son of the
returned
candidate Shri Karikho Kri bearing registration No. AR-
11-6581, as
is required to be disclosed under Clause 7(vi) of the
Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961, rendering the nomination of the
returned
candidate invalid?
4. Whether
there has been a non-submission of no dues
certificate
with regard to Electricity Charges required to be
submitted
under Clause 8(ii)(b) of Form No. 26 of the Conduct of
Election
Rules, 1961, as the respondent No. 1 was in occupation
of MLA
Cottage No. 1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from the year, 2009-
2014, while
the respondent No. 1 was an MLA of Tezu (ST)
Assembly
Constituency during the year, 2009-2014?
5. Whether
the statements made by the respondent No. 1
about the
liability of himself and his wife in respect of Municipal
Tax,
Property Tax, due and grand total of all govt. dues against
Serial No. 6
& 8 of the table in Para-8(A) of the affidavit in Form
No. 26
appended to the nomination paper of the respondent No. 1
has rendered
the nomination of respondent No. 1, defective?
4
6. Whether
the non-disclosure of assets both movable and
immovable
belonging to the respondent No. 1, his wife, his mother
and his two
sons in the affidavit in Form No. 26 appended to the
nomination
paper amounted to commission of corrupt practice of
undue
influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the
Representation
of the People Act, 1951?
7. Whether
the election of respondent No. 1 to the 44-
Tezu(ST)
Assembly Constituency is liable to be declared void
under
Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951?
8. Whether
the nature of non-disclosure alleged by the
Election
petitioner is of a substantial nature effecting the election
of the
returned candidate/respondent No. 1?
9. What
consequential relief the petitioner is entitled to, if
any?’
8. Nuney
Tayang examined 7 witnesses, including himself as PW7.
Karikho Kri
examined 39 witnesses, including himself as DW1A.
Dr. Mohesh
Chai did not choose to contest the case before the High Court,
despite
service of notice. Before us, however, he is duly represented by
learned
counsel and also filed his replies in both the appeals.
9. The High
Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation
to three out
of the four vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No.
AR-11/4474
and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100, both
registered
in the name of Bagilu Kri, his wife, and the TVS Star City
Motorcycle
bearing No. AR-11/6851, registered in the name of Goshinso
Kri, his
second son. The High Court was of the opinion that,
notwithstanding
the sale of the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No. AR-11/4474
in 2009 and
the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100 in the year
2017 and the
gifting of the TVS Star City Motorcycle bearing No. AR-
11/6851 in
2014, these vehicles continued to stand in the names of Bagilu
Kri and
Goshinso Kri, the dependent wife and son of Karikho Kri, on the
relevant
date. Upon considering the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (for
brevity, ‘the Act of 1988’) and the decision of this Court in Naveen
Kumar vs.
Vijay Kumar and others1, the High Court concluded that the
person in
whose name the motor vehicle stood registered should be treated
as the owner
thereof. In consequence, it was held that, as on the date of
presentation
of his nomination on 22.03.2019 and its scrutiny on
26.03.2019,
the above three vehicles were owned by the dependent wife
and son of
Karikho Kri but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in Form
No. 26 filed
by him.
10. On Issue
No. 4 with regard to non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’
in the context of electricity and water charges, etc., that was
required to
be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(B) of Form No. 26, the High
Court noted
that Karikho Kri had occupied government accommodation in
MLA Cottage
No.1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from 2009 to 2014, as the MLA of
1 (2018) 3
SCC 1
6
Tezu (ST)
Assembly Constituency during those years. According to Karikho
Kri, he lost
the election in 2014 and vacated the said accommodation. He
claimed that
when he filed his nomination for the Assembly Election in
2014, he
obtained a ‘No Dues Certificate’ after clearing the dues and
submitted
it. As there were no outstanding dues thereafter and he did not
occupy
government accommodation, he stated that he did not disclose the
same. As
Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in Form
No. 26, the
High Court held against him on this count.
11. As
regards Issue No. 5, pertaining to the liability of Karikho Kri and
his wife in
respect of their dues of municipal and property taxes, the High
Court found
that Karikho Kri had disclosed the taxes due and payable by
him and his
wife in one part of the Affidavit in Form No.26 submitted by
him, but
failed to do so in another part thereof. He disclosed the dues in
Part A,
Clause 8 (vi) and (viii), but failed to disclose it in Clause 9 in Part B.
Though the
High Court held against Karikho Kri even on this count, Mr.
Arunabh
Chowdhury, learned senior counsel, appearing for Nuney Tayang,
fairly
stated that he would not be pressing this ground as there was
disclosure
of the dues at least in one part of the Affidavit in Form No. 26.
12. As
regards Issue No. 6, i.e., whether non-disclosure of the three
vehicles,
registered in the names of his dependent wife and second son, by
Karikho Kri
in his Affidavit in Form No. 26 amounted to commission of a
corrupt practice
as per Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951, the High Court
referred to
case law and held that such non-disclosure amounted to a
corrupt
practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.
13. The High
Court then considered Issue No. 7, i.e., whether the
election of
Karikho Kri was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)
(d)(i) of
the Act of 1951 and opined that when the nomination of the
returned
candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted by the
Returning
Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that the election
was
‘materially affected’. As the High Court was of the opinion that the
nomination
of Karikho Kri had, in fact, been improperly accepted by the
Returning
Officer, Tezu, his election was held liable to be declared void
under
Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951.
14. On Issue
No. 8 - as to whether the non-disclosures by Karikho Kri
were of a
substantial nature affecting his election, the High Court observed
that
disclosure of information as per Form No. 26 of the Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961,
was fundamental to the concept of free and fair elections and,
therefore,
the solemnity thereof could not be ridiculed by offering
incomplete
information or suppressing material information, resulting in
disinformation
and misinformation to the voters.
15. Coming
to Issue No. 9, i.e., as to what consequential relief Nuney
Tayang would
be entitled to, if any, the High Court noted that Nuney Tayang
had secured
the least number of votes out of the three candidates and
though he
made allegations to the effect that Dr. Mohesh Chai had failed to
disclose the
properties belonging to his mother in his Affidavit in Form
No. 26, the
High Court found that Nuney Tayang had failed to lead any
evidence in
proof of this statement and, as such, there was no material to
hold that
Dr. Mohesh Chai’s mother was even his dependent. On that
basis, the
High Court held that no judgment could be pronounced against
Dr. Mohesh
Chai, solely on the basis of the pleadings and allegations made
by Nuney
Tayang in his election petition. In consequence, Nuney Tayang
was held
disentitled to relief by way of a declaration that he had been duly
elected from
44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency.
16. It is
well-settled that the success of a winning candidate at an
election
should not be lightly interfered with (See Santosh Yadav vs.
Narender
Singh2 and Harsh Kumar vs. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat and
others3).
The issue before us presently is as to the validity of the High
Court’s
findings that the grounds under Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and
100(1)(d)(iv)
of the Act of 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of
the election
of Karikho Kri. Further, the finding of the High Court on Issue
No. 6, that
Karikho Kri committed a ‘corrupt practice’ within the meaning of
Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951 also requires to be examined.
17. Section
33 of the Act of 1951 deals with ‘presentation of
nomination
papers and the requirements for a valid nomination’. Scrutiny of
such
nominations is undertaken by the Returning Officers under Section 36
of the Act
of 1951. To the extent relevant, Section 36 reads as under:
‘36. Scrutiny
of nomination:-
1. On the
date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under
section 30,
the candidates, their election agents, one proposer of
each
candidate, and one other person duly authorised in writing by
each
candidate but no other person, may attend at such time and
place as the
returning officer may appoint; and the returning officer
shall give
them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination
papers of
all candidates which have been delivered within the time
and in the
manner laid down in section 33.
2. The
returning officer shall then examine the nomination
papers and
shall decide all objections which may be made to any
nomination
and may, either on such objection or on his own motion,
after such
summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any
nomination
on any of the following grounds:—
(a) ….. or
(b) ….. or
(c) …..
3. …..
4. The
returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper
on the
ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character.
5. …..
6. The
returning officer shall endorse on each nomination
paper his
decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if the
nomination
paper is rejected, shall record in writing a brief statement
of his
reasons for such rejection.
7. …..
8.
Immediately after all the nomination papers have been
scrutinized
and decisions accepting or rejecting the same have been
recorded,
the returning officer shall prepare a list of validly nominated
candidates,
that is to say, candidates whose nominations have been
found valid,
and affix it to his notice board.
18. In terms
of Section 36(4) above, a Returning Officer is under a
mandate not
to reject a nomination paper for a defect unless it is of
substantial
character. Significantly, Nuney Tayang raised objections to the
candidature
of Karikho Kri by way of his written representation dated
26.03.2019.
Therein, he raised the issue of non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’
in respect of the government accommodation occupied by
Karikho Kri
during his tenure as an MLA from 2009 to 2014. He also raised
the issue of
non-disclosure of the vehicles, mentioned in Issue No. 1. By
his reply
dated 26.03.2019, Karikho Kri informed the Returning Officer,
Tezu, that
the vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty and the Maruti Omni
Van standing
in the name of his wife had already been disposed of as was
the TVS Star
City Motorcycle standing in the name of his dependent
second son,
which had been gifted away. As regards the non-submission of
a ‘No Dues
Certificate’, Karikho Kri asserted that there were no outstanding
dues against
any government accommodation in his name. Karikho Kri
submitted
documents with his explanation, including those pertaining to the
transfer of
the vehicles in question as well as the ‘No Dues Certificates’ of
2014.
Thereafter, Karikho Kri filed before the High Court, Certificates
issued in
2019 by the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited; the Department of
Power,
Government of Arunachal Pradesh; and the Legislative Assembly
Secretariat,
Arunachal Pradesh, confirming that there were no outstanding
dues. In
effect and in fact, there were no dues payable by Karikho Kri in
relation to
the Government accommodation occupied by him earlier.
19. In any
event, it appears that the Returning Officer concerned,
being
satisfied with the explanation and documents submitted by Karikho
Kri,
accepted his nomination. No doubt, this preliminary exercise on the
part of the
Returning Officer did not preclude the Election Tribunal, viz., the
High Court,
from examining as to whether the acceptance of Karikho Kri’s
nomination
was improper and, in consequence, whether it would have an
impact on
his election under the relevant provisions of the Act of 1951.
Section
100(1) thereof enumerates the grounds on which an election can
be
invalidated. To the extent relevant, it reads as under:
‘100.
Grounds for declaring election to be void:-
(1) Subject
to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court
is of
opinion—
(a) …..; or
(b) that any
corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidate or
his election agent or by any other person with the
consent of a
returned candidate or his election agent; or
(c) …..; or
(d) that the
result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned
candidate, has been materially affected—
(i) by the
improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii) by any
corrupt practice committed in the interests of the
returned
candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or
(iii) by the
improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or
the
reception of any vote which is void, or
(iv) by any
non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution
or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under
this Act,
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to
be void.’
20. The High
Court held against Karikho Kri not only under Sections
100(1)(d)(i)
and (iv) but also under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951, as
it was of
the opinion that his failure to disclose the three vehicles, that still
stood
registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted
to a corrupt
practice. Insofar as Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 is
concerned,
the requirement thereof for the purpose of invalidating the
election of
the returned candidate is that the High Court must form an
opinion that
a ‘corrupt practice’ was committed by the returned candidate or
his election
agent or any other person with the consent of the returned
candidate or
his election agent. Section 123 of the Act of 1951 inclusively
defines
‘corrupt practices’, by stating that what have been enumerated
thereunder
shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the
Act of 1951.
Insofar as the present case is concerned, Section 123(2) of
the Act of
1951 is of relevance. This provision reads as under:
‘123.
Corrupt practices.—
The
following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the
purposes of
this Act:—
……
(2) Undue
influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect
interference
or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his
agent, or of
any other person with the consent of the candidate or his
election
agent, with the free exercise of any electoral right:
……’
21. The High
Court opined that non-disclosure of the Kinetic Zing
Scooty and
the Maruti Omni Van that had belonged to Bagilu Kri and the
TVS Star
City Motorcycle that had belonged to Goshinso Kri, the
dependent
wife and son of Krikho Kri, was sufficient in itself to constitute
‘undue
influence’, thereby attracting Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.
However,
what is of significance is that the High Court did not doubt that
these
vehicles had been sold or gifted long before the submission of the
nomination
by Karikho Kri in 2019. This is clear from the observations in
Para 13
(xiii) of the judgment, wherein the High Court observed: ‘….at the
time of
presentation of nomination paper of respondent No. 1, and on the
date of
scrutiny of the nomination paper on 26.03.2019, notwithstanding the
aforesaid
vehicles were gifted/sold to other persons by Smti. Bagilu Kri,
wife of
respondent No. 1 as well as Shri. Goshinso Kri, son of respondent
No. 1; it
has now become imperative to decide as to who was the owner of
the
aforesaid vehicles at the time presentation of the nomination paper by
the
respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of the nomination paper
on
26.03.2019’. This finding of the High Court has attained finality as
Nuney Tayang
did not choose to challenge the same before this Court.
22. Though
it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained
registered
in the names of the wife and son of Karikho Kri, the question that
arises is as
to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified the
attributing
of a corrupt practice to Karikho Kri and the negating of his
election on
that ground. The High Court assumed that the non-disclosure of
a vehicle
registered in the name of a candidate or his dependent family
members was
sufficient in itself to constitute undue influence. In this
context, the
High Court placed reliance on the provisions of the Act of 1988
and the
decision of this Court in Naveen Kumar (supra). Section 2(30) of
the Act of
1988 defines the owner of a vehicle as under:
‘ “owner”
means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands
registered,
and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such
minor, and
in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a
hire-purchase,
agreement, or an agreement of lease or an
agreement of
hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle
under that
agreement;’
In Naveen
Kumar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing
with the
issue as to who would be the owner of an offending vehicle in the
context of
the Act of 1988 when a claim arises from an accident involving
the said
vehicle. ‘Owner’, as defined under Section 2(30) of the Act of
1988, was
considered and it was opined that the person in whose name a
vehicle
stands registered would be the owner of the vehicle for the
purposes of
the Act. Reference was made to Section 50 of the Act of 1988,
which deals
with transfer of ownership, and to various earlier decisions in
that regard
and it was observed thus:
‘13. The
consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the
above
decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression
“owner” in
Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor
vehicle
stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be
treated as
the “owner”..……In a situation such as the present where
the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but
continues to
be reflected in the records of the Registering Authority
as the owner
of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability.
Parliament
has consciously introduced the definition of the
expression
“owner” in Section 2(30), making a departure from the
provisions
of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. The principle
underlying
the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor
accident or,
in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased
victim
should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for
compensation
ought not to be burdened with following a trail of
successive
transfers, which are not registered with the Registering
Authority.
To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object
and purpose
of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must
facilitate
the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case,
the first
respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved in the
accident
within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay
compensation
stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was
uninsured.’
(emphasis is ours)
23. Notably,
the High Court overlooked the fact that the above
judgment was
rendered in the context of and for the purposes of the Act of
1988 and not
for general application. The judgment itself made it clear that
despite the
sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants
should not
be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was the owner
of the
vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the sale/transfer was not
carried out
in their books by the authorities concerned by registering the
name of the
subsequent owner, be it for whatever reason. Further, vehicles
being goods,
their sale would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of
Goods Act,
1930 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1930’), and the same make it clear
that
conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded upon
execution of
the document of sale/transfer and registration of the new
owner by the
authorities concerned would be a post-sale event. Section
2(7) of the
Act of 1930 defines goods, inter alia, to mean every kind of
movable
property, other than actionable claims and money. Chapter III of
the Act of
1930 is titled ‘Effects of the Contract’ and ‘Transfer of property as
between
seller and buyer’. Section 18 therein states that where there is a
contract for
the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is
transferred
to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. Section
19, however,
states that the property passes when intended to pass and
elaborates
that, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or
ascertained
goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such
time as the
parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
24. In
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Thiruvananthapuram,
Kerala vs.
K.T.C. Automobiles4, this Court observed that registration of a
motor
vehicle is a post-sale event but the question would arise as to when
the property
in the motor vehicle actually passed to the buyer. That was a
case
involving the first sale of a motor vehicle by the dealer to the first
owner and
is, therefore, distinguishable from the subsequent sale of a
vehicle, as
in the case on hand. It was observed therein that registration of
a motor
vehicle is a post-sale event but only after obtaining valid
registration
under the Act of 1988, a purchaser would get entitlement to use
the vehicle
in a public place. It was observed that the purchaser, as an
owner under
the Act of 1988, was obliged to obtain the certificate of
registration,
which alone would entitle him to enjoy the possession of the
vehicle by
using it in public places after meeting the other statutory
obligations
of insurance, etc. This Court rejected the contention that motor
vehicles
would be ‘unascertained goods’ till their engine number or chassis
number is
entered in the Certificate of Registration, as the sale invoice itself
would
disclose such particulars, so that the owner of the vehicle may apply
for
registration of that specific vehicle in his name. However, owing to the
statutory
provisions governing motor vehicles, this Court held that an
intending
owner or buyer of a motor vehicle cannot ascertain the particulars
of the
vehicle for appropriating it to the contract of sale till its possession is
handed over
to him after observing the requirements of the Act of 1988 and
the rules
framed thereunder and such possession can be given only at the
registration
office immediately preceding the registration. Owing to the
aforestated
legal position, this Court held that, prior to getting possession of
the motor
vehicle, the intending purchaser/owner would not have a claim
over any
‘ascertained motor vehicle’. The observations in this judgment
would,
however, have to be understood in the context of the first sale of a
vehicle by
the dealer, i.e., where such vehicle has no registration
whatsoever
as opposed to the subsequent sale of a registered vehicle.
25.
Presently, insofar as the Scooty bearing No. AR-11/4474 is
concerned,
it stood in the name of Bagilu Kri but Md. Nizammudin (DW5)
deposed that
he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold it as such to
Promod
Prasad (DW6). In turn, Promod Prasad (DW6) confirmed that he
bought the
Scooty as scrap from Md. Nizammudin (DW5). During their
cross-examination,
nothing was elicited from these witnesses to doubt their
claims.
However, letter dated 20.09.2019 addressed by the District
Transport
Officer, Lohit District, Tezu, to Bagilu Kri, manifests that the
registration
of the Scooty in her name stood cancelled only at that time.
The taxes in
respect of this Scooty were paid till 26.03.2022, as borne out
by Treasury
Challan No. 4806 dated 30.08.2019. Though much was argued
about this
payment of taxes and the fact that the receipt was issued in the
name of
Bagilu Kri, we are not inclined to give any weightage to it. The
payment was
made after the filing of the election petition and any person
could have
done so. The receipt therefor would automatically be generated
in the name
of the registered owner. We may also note that in relation to
the other
two vehicles in question, there were actual documents of
conveyance
and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Act
of 1988
being duly filled in and issued by Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri. Form
No. 29,
relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle by the
registered
owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect of each of these
vehicles but
despite the same, the transferees did not do the needful to get
their own
names registered as the owners.
26. In
Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. New India Assurance Co.
Ltd.5, the
issue before this Court was as to whether an insurance company
would be
liable to cover the claim arising out of an accident on the ground
that the
vehicle was sold to another long before the date of the accident but
the insured
continued to be the registered owner of the vehicle. Referring to
the judgment
of this Court in Naveen Kumar (supra), it was observed that
the policy
of insurance was a comprehensive policy which covered third-
party risks
as well and, therefore, the insurer could not repudiate one part
of the
policy with regard to reimbursing the owner for losses when it could
not evade
liability to third parties under the same contract of insurance. In
view of the
definition of ‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, this
Court
observed that the registered owner of the truck, on the date of the
accident,
was the insured and, therefore, the insurer could not avoid its
5 (2020) 18
SCC 224
liability
for the losses suffered by the owner, on the ground of transfer of
ownership.
This Court held that it is difficult to accept that a person who
transferred
the ownership of a goods vehicle, on receipt of consideration,
would not
report the transfer or apply for transfer of registration and thereby
continue to
incur the risks and liabilities of ownership of the said vehicle
under the
provisions of law, including the Act of 1988. This Court further
observed
that it is equally incredible that an owner of a vehicle who has
paid
consideration to acquire it would not insist on transfer of the permit
and thereby
expose himself to the penal consequences of operating a
goods
vehicle without a valid permit. This Court, accordingly, held that the
registered
owner continues to remain the owner and when the vehicle is
insured in
the name of such registered owner, the insurer would remain
liable
notwithstanding the transfer. This judgment is clearly inapplicable to
the case on
hand as it dealt with the liability of an insurer in the event of an
accident
involving the vehicle. Further, as already noted, the vehicles in
question
were transferred and the requisite forms, insofar as the transferor
was
concerned, were filled up and issued but it was the transferees who
failed to
get the vehicles transferred in their own names.
27. Mere
failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an
already
registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction
would stand
invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically
handed over
to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
treated as still
being in the possession and control of the former owner.
Once it is
accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or
sold before
the filing of the nomination by Karikho Kri, the said vehicles
cannot be
considered to be still owned by Karikho Kri’s wife and son for
purposes
other than those covered by the Act of 1988. However, the High
Court did
not take note of this distinguishing factor in the case on hand. In
Kisan
Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant and others6, the
vehicle, details
of which had been suppressed by the returned candidate,
was actually
owned and possessed by his wife and such suppression was,
accordingly,
held against him. Presently, the High Court itself concluded
that the
three vehicles in question were transferred, be it by way of sale or
gift. The
vehicles were, therefore, not owned and possessed in praesenti
by the
dependent family members of Karikho Kri at the time of the filing of
his
nomination. This point of distinction was completely lost sight of by the
High Court
but, in our considered opinion, it made all the difference.
28.
Therefore, non-disclosure of the three vehicles in question could
not be held
against Karikho Kri in the light of the aforestated analysis. Such
non-disclosure
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an
attempt on
his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath
of Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. We may note that Karikho Kri had
declared the
value of the movable assets of his dependent family members
and himself
as 8,41,87,815/-. The value of the three vehicles in question,₹
by
comparison, would be a mere miniscule of this figure. In any event,
suppression
of the value of these three vehicles would have no impact on
the
declaration of wealth by Karikho Kri and such non-disclosure could not
be said to
amount to ‘undue influence’.
29. Coming
to the next ground, if the acceptance of a nomination is
found to be
improper and it materially affects the result of the election in so
far as the
returned candidate is concerned, Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act
of 1951
would come into play. It would be appropriate and apposite at this
stage for us
to take note of precedential law on this point. In Vashist
Narain
Sharma vs. Dev Chandra and others7, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court noted
that the burden of proving that the improper acceptance of a
nomination
has materially affected the result of an election would arise in
one of three
ways: (i) where the candidate whose nomination was
improperly
accepted had secured less votes than the difference between
the returned
candidate and the candidate securing the next highest number
of votes,
(ii) where the person referred to above secured more votes, or (iii)
where the
person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the
returned
candidate himself. It was held that in the first case the result of the
election
would not be materially affected because if all the wasted votes
were added
to the votes of the candidate securing the next highest votes, it
would make
no difference to the result and the returned candidate would
retain the
seat. However, in the other two cases, the result may be
materially
affected and insofar as the third case is concerned, it may be
readily
conceded that such would be the conclusion.
30. In Hari
Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others8, a
Constitution
Bench of 7 Judges considered the scope of enquiry under
Section
100(1)(d) of the Act of 1951. It was observed that the said provision
required,
before an order setting aside an election could be made, that two
conditions
be satisfied. It must, firstly, be shown that there has been
improper
reception or refusal of a vote or reception of any vote which is
void, or
non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of
1951, or any
rules or orders made thereunder, relating to the election or
any mistake
in the use of the prescribed form and it must further be shown
that, as a
consequence thereof, the result of the election has been
materially
affected. The Bench observed that the two conditions are
cumulative
and must both be established. It was further observed that the
burden of
establishing them is on the person who seeks to have the
election set
aside. Reference was also made to Vashist Narain (supra).
31. In Kamta
Prasad Upadhyaya vs. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and
others9,
another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed the legal position
settled by
Vashist Narain (supra). Again, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs.
Kailash
Kushanrao Gorantyal and others10, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court
affirmed the view taken in Vashist Narain (supra) that, where a
person whose
nomination has been improperly accepted is the returned
candidate
himself, it may be readily conceded that the conclusion has to be
that the
result of the election was ‘materially affected’ without their being
any
necessity to plead and prove the same.
32. In
Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari
Ramachandra
Reddy and others11, another 3-Judge Bench of this Court
affirmed
that if there are more than two candidates and if the nomination of
one of the
defeated candidates has been improperly accepted, a question
might arise
as to whether the result of the election of the returned
candidate
has been materially affected by such improper reception but that
would not be
so in the case of challenge to the election of the returned
candidate
himself on the ground of improper acceptance of his nomination.
33. Ergo, if
acceptance of the nomination of the returned candidate is
shown to be
improper, it would automatically mean that the same materially
affected the
result of the election and nothing more needs to be pleaded or
proved.
However, whether acceptance of the nomination of Karikho Kri was
actually
improper is the main issue that requires to be addressed by us.
34. We may
also take note of curial wisdom on the issue as to what
would be the
defects that would taint a nomination to the extent of
rendering
its acceptance improper. In Resurgence India vs. Election
Commission
of India and another12, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
observed that
if the Election Commission accepts nomination papers in
spite of
blank particulars therein, it would directly violate the fundamental
right of the
citizen to know the criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and
educational
qualifications of the candidate. It was observed that accepting
an affidavit
with such blanks would rescind the verdict in Union of India
vs.
Association for Democratic Reforms and another13. In effect, the
Bench held
that filing of an affidavit with blank particulars would render the
affidavit
nugatory. In Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra), the issue before this
Court was
whether non-disclosure of certain government dues in the
nomination
would amount to a material lapse impacting the election of the
returned
candidate. On facts, this Court found that the non-disclosure of
electricity
and municipal dues was not a serious lapse as there was a
dispute
raised in the context thereof. Having said so, this Court clarified
that it
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to
whether such
non-disclosure would amount to a material lapse or not. This
Court,
however, found that there were, in fact, material lapses by the
returned
candidate, inasmuch as he had failed to disclose the bungalow
standing in
the name of his wife and also a vehicle owned by her. Further,
he had also
failed to disclose his interest/share in a partnership firm which
amounted to
a very serious and major lapse. The observations of this
Court, in
the context of improper acceptance of his nomination, are of
relevance:
‘43. When
the information is given by a candidate in the affidavit
filed along
with the nomination paper and objections are raised
thereto
questioning the correctness of the information or alleging that
there is
non-disclosure of certain important information, it may not be
possible for
the Returning Officer at that time to conduct a detailed
examination.
Summary enquiry may not suffice. The present case is
itself an
example which loudly demonstrates this. At the same time, it
would not be
possible for the Returning Officer to reject the
nomination
for want of verification about the allegations made by the
objector. In
such a case, when ultimately it is proved that it was a
case of
non-disclosure and either the affidavit was false or it did not
contain
complete information leading to suppression, it can be held at
that stage
that the nomination was improperly accepted. Ms
Meenakshi
Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Election
Commission,
rightly argued that such an enquiry can be only at a
later stage
and the appropriate stage would be in an election petition
as in the
instant case, when the election is challenged. The grounds
stated in
Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there and
then and on
that basis the Returning Officer would be in a position to
reject the
nomination. Likewise, where the blanks are left in an
affidavit,
nomination can be rejected there and then. In other cases
where
detailed enquiry is needed, it would depend upon the outcome
thereof, in
an election petition, as to whether the nomination was
properly
accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it is
found that
it was a case of improper acceptance, as there was
misinformation
or suppression of material i`nformation, one can state
that
question of rejection in such a case was only deferred to a later
date. When
the Court gives such a finding, which would have
resulted in
rejection, the effect would be same, namely, such a
candidate
was not entitled to contest and the election is void.
Otherwise,
it would be an anomalous situation that even when
criminal
proceedings under Section 125-A of the Act can be initiated
and the
selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted,
but the
result of his election cannot be questioned. This cannot be
countenanced.’
35. In Lok
Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla vs. Union
of India and
others14, this Court observed that non-disclosure of assets
and sources
of income of candidates and their associates would constitute
a corrupt
practice falling under the heading ‘undue influence’, as defined
under
Section 123 (2) of the Act of 1951. In S. Rukmini Madegowda vs.
14 (2018) 4
SCC 699
29
State
Election Commission and others15, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
observed
that a false declaration with regard to the assets of a candidate,
his/her
spouse or dependents, would constitute a corrupt practice
irrespective
of its impact on the election of the candidate as it may be
presumed
that a false declaration would impact the election.
36. In
Mairembam Prithviraj alias Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem
Sharatchandra
Singh16, this Court noted that there is a difference between
improper
acceptance of the nomination of a returned candidate as opposed
to improper
acceptance of the nomination of any other candidate. It was
observed
that a mere finding that there has been an improper acceptance
of a nomination
would not be sufficient for a declaration that the election is
void under
Section 100(1)(d)(i) and there has to be further pleading and
proof that
the result of the election of the returned candidate was materially
affected,
but there would be no necessity of any such proof in the event of
the
nomination of the returned candidate being declared as having been
improperly
accepted, especially in a case where there are only two
candidates
in the fray.
37. In
Association for Democratic Reforms and another vs. Union
of India and
others17, a Constitution Bench affirmed that, in terms of the
earlier
judgments in Association for Democratic Reforms and another
(supra) and
People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another vs.
Union of
India and another18, the right of voters to information, which is
traceable to
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, is built upon the
jurisprudence
that information which furthers democratic participation must
be provided
to citizens and voters have a right to information which would
enable them
to cast their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is
one of the
foremost forms of democratic participation. It was further
observed
that voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is
‘essential’
for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast.
38. In his
Affidavit in Form No. 26, Karikho Kri was required to state as
to whether
he had been in occupation of accommodation provided by the
Government
at any time during the last 10 years before the date of
notification
of the current election and, if so, he was to furnish a declaration
to the
effect that there were no dues payable in respect of the said
accommodation
in relation to rent, electricity charges, water charges and
telephone
charges. Karikho Kri, however, failed to disclose the fact that he
had been in
occupation of government accommodation during his tenure as
an MLA
between 2009 and 2014. He stated ‘Not applicable’. However, with
regard to
the declaration as to there being no dues, he mentioned the date
‘22.03.2019’ and stated that the dues in
respect of rent, electricity charges,
water
charges and telephone charges were ‘Nil’. After Nuney Tayang raised
an objection
to his candidature on this ground, Karikho Kri filed the
requisite
‘No Due Certificates’ of 2014.
.39.
However, the High Court was of the opinion that the failure of
Karikho Kri
to disclose the factum of his occupying government
accommodation
from 2009 to 2014 and his failure to submit the ‘No Dues
Certificate’
in relation to such government accommodation was sufficient, in
itself, to
infer that his nomination was defective and, in consequence, the
acceptance
thereof by the Returning Officer, Tezu, was improper.
40. Having
considered the issue, we are of the firm view that every
defect in
the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such
character as
to render its acceptance improper and each case would have
to turn on
its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect is concerned. The
case law on
the subject also manifests that this Court has always drawn a
distinction
between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed to
insubstantial
issues, which may not impact one’s candidature or the result
of an
election. The very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of
the
Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of the opinion
that the
defect is of a substantial nature demonstrates that this distinction
must always
be kept in mind and there is no absolute mandate that every
non-disclosure,
irrespective of its gravity and impact, would automatically
amount to a
defect of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the
result of
the election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a
corrupt
practice.
41. The
decision of this Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra),
also demonstrates
this principle, as this Court undertook examination of
several
individual defects in the nomination of the returned candidate and
found that
some of them were actually insubstantial in character. This Court
noted that
two facets required consideration – Whether there is substantial
compliance
in disclosing requisite information in the affidavits filed along
with the
nomination and whether non-disclosure of information on identified
aspects
materially affected the result of the election. This Court observed,
on facts,
that non-disclosure of the electricity dues in that case was not a
serious
lapse, despite the fact that there were dues outstanding, as there
was a
bonafide dispute about the same. Similar was the observation in
relation to
non-disclosure of municipal dues, where there was a genuine
dispute as
to re-valuation and re-assessment for the purpose of tax
assessment.
Earlier, in Sambhu Prasad Sharma vs. Charandas
Mahant19,
this Court observed that the form of the nomination paper is not
considered
sacrosanct and what is to be seen is whether there is
substantial
compliance with the requirement as to form and every departure
from the
prescribed format cannot, therefore, be made a ground for the
rejection of
the nomination paper.
42. In the
case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were no actual
outstanding
dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to the government
accommodation
occupied by him earlier. His failure in disclosing the fact
that he had
occupied such accommodation and in filing the ‘No Dues
Certificate’
in that regard, with his nomination form, cannot be said to be a
defect of
any real import. More so, as he did submit the relevant documents
of 2014
after Nuney Tayang raised an objection before the Returning
Officer. His
explanation that he submitted such Certificates in the year 2014
when he
stood for re-election as an MLA is logical and worthy of
acceptance.
The most important aspect to be noted is that there were no
actual dues
and the failure of Karikho Kri to disclose that he had been in
occupation
of government accommodation during the years 2009 to 2014
cannot be
treated as a defect that is of substantial character so as to taint
his
nomination and render its acceptance improper.
43. The High
Court opined that the nomination of Karikho Kri was
improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer as he had failed to disclose
the three
vehicles in question, which continued to be registered in the name
of his
dependent family members. Non-submission of the ‘No Dues
Certificate’
in respect of the government accommodation occupied by him
during his
earlier tenure as an MLA was also held to weigh against him.
Lastly, the
High Court held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and
payable by
Karikho Kri and his wife was a defect of substantial character
and the same
tainted his nomination. In consequence, the High Court
concluded
that the acceptance of Karikho Kri’s nomination by the Returning
Officer was
improper and as he was the returned candidate, the question of
pleading and
proving that such improper acceptance of his nomination
materially
affected the result of the election did not arise.
44. Though
it has been strenuously contended before us that the
voter’s
‘right to know’ is absolute and a candidate contesting the election
must be
forthright about all his particulars, we are not inclined to accept the
blanket
proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out threadbare
for
examination by the electorate. His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as
regards
matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his
candidature
for public office. In that respect, non-disclosure of each and
every asset
owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect, much
less, a
defect of a substantial character. It is not necessary that a candidate
declare
every item of movable property that he or his dependent family
members
owns, such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture,
etc., unless
the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in
itself or
reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to
be
disclosed. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and
there can be
no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the
non-disclosure
of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount
to a defect
of a substantial character. For example, a candidate and his
family who
own several high-priced watches, which would aggregate to a
huge figure
in terms of monetary value, would obviously have to disclose
the same as
they constitute an asset of high value and also reflect upon his
lavish
lifestyle. Suppression of the same would constitute ‘undue influence’
upon the
voter as that relevant information about the candidate is being
kept away
from the voter. However, if a candidate and his family members
each own a
simple watch, which is not highly priced, suppression of the
value of
such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would,
therefore,
have to be judged on its own facts.
45. So far
as the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of
1951 is
concerned, the provision requires that the established
non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or
any rules or
orders made thereunder necessarily has to be shown to have
materially
affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns the
returned
candidate. Significantly, the High Court linked all the
non-disclosures
attributed to Karikho Kri to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of
1951 but
ultimately concluded that his election stood invalidated under
Section
100(1)(d)(iv) thereof. Surprisingly, there is no discussion
whatsoever
on what were the violations which qualified as non-compliance
with the
provisions of either the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules
and orders
framed thereunder, for the purposes of Section 100(1)(d)(iv),
and as to
how the same materially affected the result of the election.
46. In
Mangani Lal Mandal vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari20, this Court
held that
where a returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of
non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or
any rules or
orders made thereunder and his election is sought to be
declared
void on that ground, it is essential for the election petitioner to
aver, by
pleading material facts, that the result of the election insofar as it
concerned
the returned candidate has been materially affected by such
breach or
non-observance. It was further held that it is only on the basis of
such
pleading and proof that the Court would be in a position to form an
opinion and
record a finding that such breach or non-compliance has
materially
affected the result of the election before election of the returned
candidate
could be declared void. It was further observed that mere
non-compliance
or breach of the Constitution or the statutory provisions, as
stated
above, would not result in invalidating the election of the returned
candidate
under Section 100 (1)(d)(iv) as the sine qua non for declaring the
election of
a returned candidate to be void on that ground under clause (iv)
of Section
100 (1)(d) is further proof of the fact that such breach or non-
observance
has resulted in materially affecting the election of the returned
candidate.
For the election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz.,
Section 100
(1)(d)(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but
also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the
returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby.
47. In L.R.
Shivaramagowda and others vs. T.M.
Chandrashekar
(Dead) by LRs and others21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
pointed out
that in order to declare an election void under Section 100(1)(d)
(iv) of the
Act of 1951, it is absolutely necessary for the election petitioner
to plead
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate,
has been materially affected by the alleged non-compliance with
the
provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules or orders
made
thereunder and the failure to plead such material facts would be fatal
to the
election petition.
48. However,
perusal of the election petition filed by Nuney Tayang
reflects
that the only statement made by him in this regard is in Paragraph
21 and it
reads as follows:
‘……Hence,
his nomination papers suffer from substantial and material
defects. As
such, the result of the election, insofar as the respondent
No.1 is
concerned, is materially affected by the improper acceptance of
his
nomination as well as by the non-compliance with the provisions of
the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules and orders
made
thereunder, including Section 33(1) of the Representation of the
People Act,
1951, Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and
the orders
made thereunder…...’
Again, in
his ‘Ground No. (ii)’, Nuney Tayang stated as under:
‘…….As such,
the nomination papers of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
were
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer and the result of the
election in
question, insofar as it concerns the respondent No.1 the
return
candidate, as well as the respondent No.2, has been materially
affected by
such improper acceptance of their nominations……’
Though there
are some general references to non-compliance with
particular
provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder, we
do not find
adequate pleadings or proof to substantiate and satisfy the
requirements
of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. Therefore, it is
clear that
Nuney Tayang tied up the improper acceptance of Karikho Kri’s
nomination,
relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951, with the
non-compliance
relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(iv) thereof and he did not
sufficiently
plead or prove a specific breach or how it materially affected the
result of
the election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate,
Karikho Kri.
It was not open to Nuney Tayang to link up separate issues
and fail to
plead in detail and adduce sufficient evidence in relation to the
non-compliance
that would attract Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951.
The finding
of the High Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and
reason and
cannot be sustained.
49. As
regards the failure on the part of Karikho Kri to disclose the
dues of
municipal/property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same
cannot be
held to be a non-disclosure at all, inasmuch as he did disclose
the
particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did not do so in
another
part. In any event, as Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned senior
counsel,
fairly stated that he would not be pressing this ground, we need
not labour
further upon this point.
50. On the
above analysis, we hold that the High Court was in error in
concluding
that sufficient grounds were made out under Sections 100(1)(b),
100(1)(d)(i)
and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 to invalidate the election of
Karikho Kri
and, further, in holding that non-disclosure of the three vehicles,
that still
remained registered in the names of his wife and son as on the
date of
filing of his nomination, amounted to a ‘corrupt practice’ under
Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. In consequence, we find no necessity to
independently
deal with Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023 filed by Nuney
Tayang, in
the context of denial of relief to him by the High Court, or the
issues
raised by Dr. Mohesh Chai in the replies filed by him.
51. In the
result, Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023 filed by Karikho Kri is
allowed,
setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023 passed
by the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and
Arunachal
Pradesh in Election Petition No.01(AP) of 2019. In
consequence,
the election of Karikho Kri as the returned candidate from 44
Tezu (ST)
Assembly Constituency of the State of Arunachal Pradesh is
upheld.
As a
corollary, Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023, filed by Nuney
Tayang,
shall stand dismissed.
Pending
applications in both the appeals, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
This
decision shall be intimated to the Election Commission of
India and to
the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the State of
Arunachal
Pradesh forthwith, as required by Section 116C(2) of the Act of
1951.
An
authenticated copy of this judgment shall be sent to the
Election
Commission of India forthwith.
Parties
shall bear their own costs.
………………………..,J
(ANIRUDDHA
BOSE)
………………………..,J
(SANJAY KUMAR)
April 9,
2024 New
Delhi.
Thus, from the above it is clear that it is not compulsory to
transfer the vehicle (RC transfer) after it is sold in order to establish the sale or
purchase of the vehicle in question. The purchase will deemed to have taken
place fully whether registered with the authority or not. Just the transaction
needs to be proved.
